This paper investigates the performance of copycat funds, which are free-riding on disclosed asset holdings of actively managed mutual funds. On average, copycat funds are able to marginally outperform their target mutual funds, but the relative success of copycat funds has increased after 2004, when SEC regulation imposed all mutual funds to quarterly disclose their holdings. We document a substantial cross-sectional dispersion in the performance of copycat funds. Free-riding on the portfolios disclosed by past winner funds, funds disclosing representative holdings, small funds and low-expense funds generates significantly better performance net of trading costs and expenses than the vast majority of mutual funds. The results indicate that free-riding on disclosed fund holdings is an attractive strategy and suggest that mutual funds may suffer from information disclosure requirements.
I Introduction
The disclosure of a mutual fund portfolio allows outside investors to share the benefits of fund research without incurring the actual cost of owning the fund shares. Investors can simply "free ride" on mutual fund investment strategies through the direct mimicking of disclosed portfolio holdings. Even though portfolio information is typically two months old at the time of publication, this generates the question to what extent portfolio disclosure reveals valuable information and how outsiders could capitalize most on fund research at no cost to themselves. If the reported holdings unveil valuable investment opportunities and most importantly such opportunities are not evanescent, then investors who trade on such information, even with a time lag, would be able to make a substantial profit. In 2004 the SEC increases the mandatory reporting frequency for U.S. mutual funds from semi-annually to quarterly, which would likely increase the potential for free-riding. With more frequently updated portfolio lists, a potential free rider could more easily capture the majority of the profits from fund research. 1 The expanding free-riding opportunities are of concern, since these mimicking investments could impair an active fund"s performance by moving security prices before the fund fully accumulates or liquidates a position (as discussed by Wermers (2001)). Our study provides empirical evidence on the success of a free-riding strategy relative to the primitive active funds, characterized by a change in the SEC disclosure regulation. The result is of significant importance for increasing the investors" understanding of the simplest way in which holdings information can be utilized more effectively.
In the present study, we construct "copycat funds" by strictly duplicating the active funds" disclosed portfolios and rebalancing whenever new holdings are reported. We measure the relative success of free-riding by comparing the performance between a copycat fund and the target active fund. Analyzing quarterly disclosed holdings of 3,046 active U.S. mutual funds over the period, we find that in aggregate copycat funds generate an average net return that is statistically indistinguishable from that of the active funds. In particular, copycat funds on average outperform their actively managed counterparts by 0.017% per month, netting of trading costs and expenses. These results indicate that outside investors could in general earn comparable net returns to active mutual funds by simply replicating the periodically disclosed fund portfolios.
At the same time, we find that mandating more frequent portfolio disclosure enhances the tracking performance of copycat funds. Specifically, the average relative performance of copycat funds begins to stabilize and increase significantly after the SEC requires more frequent portfolio disclosure in 2004. The pattern is especially salient for mimicking a subsample of mutual funds that have experienced and survived past the policy change. The improvement in net relative returns for those copycat funds amounts to 0.06% per month. These findings confirm our expectations that requiring more frequent portfolio disclosure would expand the opportunities for potential free-riders to successfully track or even beat their actively managed counterparts.
We also document a substantial cross-sectional dispersion in the relative success of copycat funds. Our results at the aggregate level do not preclude finding any particular sample of mutual funds whose portfolio disclosures reveal more valuable private information. A more realistic free-riding strategy is to focus upon the holdings reported by certain types of mutual funds, e.g. funds that have established a record of successful investments. Outside investors might apply various techniques to returns and holdings data to infer stock-picking talents of active funds. Previous studies provide some grounds on this issue. Wermers (2003) suggests that a "copycat" strategy of tracking winning fund stock trades appears to be the smartest strategy to take advantage of flowrelated returns. Coval, Cohen and Pastor (2005) and Wermers, Yao and Zhao (2007) have developed new approaches to discovering the investment value embedded in the individual stocks held by mutual funds. Our study, in particular, shows that the copycat funds mimicking past winning funds, funds that report representative holdings, and small and low-expense funds are able to significantly outperform the majority of the mutual fund universe after trading costs and expenses. The superior performance of such selective copycat strategies helps pinpoint the types of active funds that are the most likely to be subject to free-riding activities.
A prerequisite for the relative success of copycat funds is to verify the validity of the information content contained in each portfolio disclosure. A mutual fund manager might have different incentives to either reduce or increase the information contained in portfolio disclosures hoping to revise the investors" impression on the fund beyond what has been revealed in past returns, e.g. by "window dressing" or "portfolio pumping". 2 Besides camouflaging their portfolio snapshots, active funds may also engage in active interim trading based on new private information received between disclosure dates. In such circumstances, the reported holdings are not well representative of the true underlying fund investment strategies. Understanding the extent to which a fund"s disclosed holdings are representative of its true investment style in the recent past is of critical importance for our copycat strategies. Representativeness of holdings, measured by the tracking error of a mutual fund relative to a characteristic-based benchmark, appears to be a powerful predictor of the relative success of copycat funds. Copycat funds using "more representative" holdings tend to outperform not only their actively managed counterparts but also the vast majority of active mutual funds.
The availability of mutual fund holdings data has led to a plethora of empirical studies on mutual fund performance measurement, investment strategy development, institutional ownership changes and fund inflows and outflows. 3 Nevertheless, there have been few studies focusing on the tracking performance of free-riding strategies and the association of portfolio disclosure with fund performance and investor reactions. Frank, Poterba, Shackelford and Shoven (2004) analyze the semi-annually reported holdings of 20 high-expense mutual funds in the 1990s and find that 2 "Window Dressing" is defined as buying or selling portfolio securities shortly before the date as of which a fund's holdings are publicly disclosed, in order to convey an impression that the manager has been investing in companies that have had exceptional performance during the reporting period. "Portfolio Pumping" is defined as buying shares of stock the fund already owns on the last day of the reporting period, in order to drive up the price of the stocks and inflate the fund's performance results. See "Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of Registered Management Investment Companies; Final Rule", 17 CFR Parts 210, 239, 249, 270 , and 274, available from http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ 33-8393.htm. an average copycat fund earns statistically indistinguishable returns net of expenses from its primitive fund. In the current paper we expand and extend their analysis by focusing upon the cross-sectional variation in the performance of copycat funds and further finding out what kinds of holdings data have the most worth for a selective copycat strategy. Having access to a more complete dataset with both mandatory and voluntary portfolio disclosures, we also evaluate the effectiveness of the disclosure policy change in 2004 and the impact of mandating more frequent disclosure on tracking performance. Moreover, we analyze the extent to which reported fund holdings represent the true investment style of the disclosing fund. Finally, we enhance the practical relevance of our study by estimating the possible transaction costs for copycat funds. Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2008) investigate the impact of unobserved actions of US equity funds on future fund performance by defining the "return gap" between the reported fund return and the return on a portfolio that invests in the previously disclosed fund holdings. Our work differs from theirs in that we shift the object of study from active funds to the potential free-riders who expect to track the active fund"s performance and measure the extent to which outdated holdings are useful. Our study provides insights into how investors could make the most effective direct use of disclosed fund holdings to maintain a successful free-riding strategy.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II briefly reviews the dynamics of U.S. disclosure regulations for mutual funds. Section III describes the database used in this study and provides summary statistics. Section IV presents the main methodology to construct copycat portfolios and to compare copycat funds with their actively managed counterparts. Section V examines the relative success of copycat funds in the aggregate level and its determinants. Section VI considers the cross-sectional variation in the performance of copycat funds and the role of the representativeness of disclosed holdings. Section VII concludes.
II Portfolio Disclosure Regulatory Framework for U.S. Mutual Funds
The Investment Company Act historically required all registered US investment management companies to transmit reports to their shareholders and to file these shareholder reports with the SEC within 10 days after the transmission to shareholders. These fund reports have long served as the primary vehicle to communicate information regarding both fund performance and portfolio composition to investors. Aiming at improving the effectiveness of such information conveying tools especially the portfolio disclosure part of the reports, many petitioners from both the investor groups and investment management industry had suggested ways to improve the disclosure regime by the end of 2003. 4 They believed that investors could benefit from the enhanced transparency by both increasing the frequency with which mutual funds are required to disclose their portfolio holdings and streamlining the portfolio schedules delivered to shareholders. In their petitions, they also argued that more frequent portfolio disclosure by mutual funds would allow investors to better monitor the extent of their portfolio diversification and hence enable them to make more informed asset allocation decisions. In addition, the transparency supporters believed that investors would have greater information to check how a fund was complying with its stated investment objective and therefore be able to avoid investing in style-drifting funds. In their opinions, more frequent disclosure would also shed light on the problems of portfolio manipulation such as "window dressing" and "portfolio pumping". In response to the demand for better portfolio disclosure regulation, the industry members, investor advocacy groups, consultants and academics. Some commenters appeared to support the Commission"s proposal to improve the transparency of the periodic portfolio disclosures provided to investors. By contrast, other commenters including members of the investment management groups raised concerns that frequent portfolio disclosure with a short reporting delay might encourage predatory trading practices in the market.
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More frequent portfolio disclosure would facilitate the ability of professional traders and other opportunists to expropriate the results of mutual funds" proprietary research and investment acumen. Such exploitation of reported holdings may lead to additional costs that will be passed on to fund shareholders in the form of sacrificed fund performance and the consequent erosion of market share. Wermers (2001) examines in a more rigorous fashion the harmful consequences of requiring more frequent portfolio disclosure. He concludes that under more frequent disclosure mandate abusive activities such as free-riding would increase and adversely affect fund performance by preventing a fund from fully realizing the potential benefits of its research efforts.
In an attempt to strike a balance between the benefits and costs associated with disclosing fund holdings, the Commission decided to adopt quarterly disclosure requirement with a 60-day filing delay in the final amendments which took effect in May of 2004. Although some commenters from the investor advocacy groups proposed monthly disclosure with 30-day filing delays, the Commission did not take that into account when making the final portfolio disclosure rules.
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Therefore, our analysis is also motivated by the desire to understand the impact of increased mandatory reporting frequency on fund performance and to justify the policymakers" rulemaking. Taking into account the information content of the disclosure per se allows us to gain a deeper insight into the usefulness of outdated portfolio data for free-riding activities and the possible responses by mutual funds to such predatory trading practices. 1980) . 8 The third database contains stock prices and returns from the CRSP NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq stock files, which has been widely used in a vast literature of financial studies especially in the field of empirical asset pricing. We merge the CRSP MFDB with the TFN CDA/Spectrum holdings data using the MFLINKS database provided by WRDS to obtain a complete record of the stock holdings of a given mutual fund along with the fund"s total net returns and other characteristics. 9 Our sample spans the 24-year sample period from January 1985
to December 2008. To concentrate our analysis on open-end US domestic active equity mutual funds, for which the holdings data are most complete and reliable, we eliminate balanced, bond, money market, international, index funds and sector funds, as well as funds not invested primarily in equity securities. For funds with multiple share classes, we eliminate the duplicated funds that share one underlying portfolio. Appendix A provides details on the sample selection (based on investment objectives and portfolio equity concentration) and the merging process of the aforementioned three databases.
Before the SEC disclosure rule amendments took effect in 2004, the Commission had required under the Rule 30b1-1 that all registered investment companies file their portfolio holdings within 60 days after the end of each fiscal six-month period. These SEC filings, together with the voluntary quarterly reports to shareholders and informal reports to CDA constitute the main source of our database. On average, the filing dates are 60 days after the end of each fiscal quarter in our database. 10 In TFN/CDA database the dates when the portfolio snapshots are taken (Report Dates) do not always correspond to quarter-ends. Nonetheless, Wermers (1999 , 2000 has reported that a vast majority of mutual funds use fiscal years with quarters that coincide with calendar quarters. Table I reports the summary statistics for our merged mutual fund database. Our sample includes 3,046 distinct U.S. equity mutual funds over the period from 1985 to 2008. The mutual funds in our sample on average invest 95.03% of their assets in common stocks and less than 5% in other asset classes. Cash or cash equivalents are the major part of the remaining investments (4.69%). Therefore, our database well represents the universe of US domestic funds with an investment focus on equity. Besides the investment composition, Table I also summarizes other fund attributes that are obtained from the CRSP MFDB and are used as the explanatory variables in some analyses of this study. An average mutual fund in our database has a TNA of $875.70 million, expense ratio of 1.30% per year and turnover ratio of 91.39% per year. The relatively high expense ratios of active funds facilitate the potential free-riders" relative success by taking the most of their cost advantage. Table I also presents summary statistics of various performance measures for both active and copycat funds. On average, mutual funds generate 0.70% per month before expenses and 0.59% per month netting of expenses. The rationale of constructing a copycat fund, estimating its trading costs and comparing the performance between a copycat fund and an active fund will be presented in the next section. However, we can still have a general picture here by looking at the mean monthly copycat returns before and after expenses. The average copycat fund earns 0.68% per month before any expenses. After subtracting the monthly trading cost of 0.05%, the gross copycat fund return decreases to 0.63% per month. The mean net return of copycat funds after expenses is 0.61% per month which is slightly higher than the average monthly net mutual fund return (0.59%).
IV Methodology

A. Measuring Copycat Portfolio Returns
We compute the gross return for a copycat fund as the total return of a hypothetical buy-and-hold portfolio that invests in the most recently disclosed stock positions. 11 To be specific, the monthly holding period return is the weighted average return of stock holdings and other individual assets for each particular month. In equation (1), N stands for the total number of assets and i represents each individual asset. Thus for fund j in month t, the return on disclosed holdings equals:
The weights of the individual asset classes depend on the number of shares held by the fund at the most recent disclosure date at time t-τ ( , j it N   ) and the stock price at the end of the previous month (P i,t-1 ).
12 Different from Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2008) study, we do not use the report dates (RDATE) in the TFN/CDA database to rebalance our portfolio because we are constructing a practically implementable copycat strategy. The report dates provided by the TFN database are not the dates when holdings are disclosed to the public but the dates on which holdings are valid. Based on the disclosure requirement described in Section II, we make the assumption that a filing date is 60 days after each report date. Our copycat portfolio for each active mutual fund is rebalanced on each filing date. The intervals between filing dates are usually 3 months but can be as short as 1 month or as long as 8 months.
13 This is mainly due to the differences in funds" reporting frequencies and fiscal year ends. 14 We also adjust the number of shares and the stock prices across months in each holding period for stock splits and other share adjustment using the accumulative adjustment factor given by CRSP. Thus the value weight for stock i in the portfolio disclosed by mutual fund j at the end of the month t-1 equals
The TFN/CDA holdings database only contains common stock positions and excludes other nonequity holdings. To adjust the copycat returns for the returns on the various asset classes, we proxy for these assets" returns using published indices. The value weights for each other asset class can be found in the CRSP mutual fund summary database. We assume all bonds and preferred stocks held by mutual funds earn the Barclays Lehman Brothers Aggregate Bond Index returns and all cash and other asset classes earn the Treasury-bill monthly return. 15 To investigate the possible effect of portfolio disclosure frequency on fund performance, we recompute the copycat portfolio returns by rebalancing the portfolio less frequently. We expect that using more updated holdings could generate higher gross returns than using outdated data.
B. Estimating Trading Costs of Copycat Funds
In order to correctly measure the net returns of our copycat strategy, we estimate the transaction costs for copycat funds based on the studies by Stoll (1995) , Keim and Madhavan (1997) , Wermers (2000) and Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2008) . Frank, Poterba, Shackelford and Shoven (2004) do not take into account the possible trading costs for copycat funds and thus the net performance of copycat funds in their study has been overestimated relative to that of active funds. We define in this study the net return of a mutual fund as the investment profits net of total institutional trading costs and all expenses for that fund. These trading costs consist of brokerage commissions, effective spreads and possible market impacts. While explicit costs such as brokerage commissions are easy to quantify, the implicit costs are hard to measure. The major implicit trading cost is the price impact of the trade. Correctly estimating trading costs would enable us to compare the gross/net returns between the active and the copycat strategies in a fair manner. To be specific, Keim and Madhavan (1997) provide fitted regressions to estimate the total institutional execution costs (explicit and implicit costs) for a sample of mutual funds during the period of 1991 -1993 . Wermers (2000 re-computes the coefficients in the fitted regression of Keim and Madhavan (1997) without trader dummies since the trader types for fund transactions are hard to collect in CRSP and Thomson databases. We start by calculating the amounts of trading orders (both buy and sell) for each stock held by a particular fund as of each filing date.
13 For example, the report dates can be April 30th and December 31st for a certain year. The corresponding filing dates are June 30th in the same year and February 28th/29th the next year. Thus the interval between the filing dates is 8 months. On the other hand, if the report dates are March 31st and April 30th and thus the filing dates are at the end of May and June respectively, then the hypothetical portfolio is rebalanced one month later.
14 If the previous report is more than 6 months old, we treat the observation as missing. 
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where C i,t B is the total costs (in percentage of the trade value) of buying stock i during period t, while C i,t S is the total costs (in percentage of the trade value) of selling stock i during period t;
Trsize is the trade size (dollar value of trade divided by market capitalization of the stock); Log(mcap i,t ) is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the stock (in thousands); P i,t is the stock price; D i,t Dasdaq is a dummy variable that equals one if the trade occurs on Nasdaq (as opposed to NYSE or AMEX). In addition, we follow Stoll (1995) and Wermers (2000) to adjust the fitted execution costs with a "year factor", Y t k , which is equal to the average execution cost during the year in which period t falls divided by the 1992 average execution cost for market k. The year of 1992 is used as the baseline year because it is the middle trading year in Keim and Madhavan (1997) study. Having computed the costs of all trades for a fund at a certain filing date, we estimate the total trading costs for that fund by summing the costs of all trades and dividing by the total value of the fund"s stock portfolio at the beginning of the period. In addition, we winsorize the estimated trading costs in percentage of the trade value or asset value at 0.5%/99.5% in tails in order to remove the contaminating effect of outliers. Monthly transaction costs are calculated by dividing the aggregate transaction costs at a given filing date by the number of months since the last filing date.
C. Comparing Copycat Fund Returns with Mutual Fund Returns
The monthly gross return (GR t ) is computed by adding fees back to the CRSP fund net return. We follow the methods of computing gross returns by Cohen, Coval and Pastor (2005) . That is, we divide the annual expense ratio by 12, and add the resulting number to each monthly net return (NR t ) in a given year. In CRSP database, the expense ratios are composed of management fees, 12b-1 fees and other administrative expenses. The expense ratio is useful because it shows the 16 Stock splits and other share adjustments have been taken into account. We also estimate the trading costs borne by copycat funds under different assumptions of asset/order sizes for copycat funds. It is possible that a fund manager does have persistent investment skills but the performance of the fund may be encumbered by the diseconomies of scale (Berk and Green, 2004) and high trading costs of large orders (Keim and Madhavan, 1997). As indicated by equations (3) and (4), the trade size relative to the market capitalization of a given stock is positively associated with the trading costs per order. In unreported results, we find that the trading costs of maintaining a copycat fund that is 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% as large as the target active fund would only differ in the second decimal place in percentages. Thus the copycat funds" flexibility in deciding order sizes does not save them much money in trading costs. This finding justifies our construction of copycat funds buying the same amount of assets as the active funds in the present study.
actual amount that a fund takes out of its assets each year to cover its expenses. We compute the gross mutual fund return as specified in (5). For fund j in month t, the gross return is equal to:
We start our analysis by evaluating the performance of a copycat fund relative to the primitive active fund. We compute the gross return difference between the two strategies both before and after trading costs. It measures to what extent a copycat strategy outperforms the active fund it tracks before all expenses. It is possible that the copycat fund underperform the corresponding active equity fund before expenses because the biggest advantage of such a mimicking strategy does not lie in the diminishing value of the outdated portfolio disclosure but mainly in the much lower cost needed to implement and maintain such a strategy. To see how the expense ratios play a role here, we also calculate the net return difference between the two types of funds. Even if a copycat fund cannot generate comparable gross performance as the active fund, we would still expect the relative success of the potential free-riders in net return on average if their disadvantages in timely access to research findings can be offset by low expenses. A critical issue here is how to measure the expense ratio for our hypothetical mimicking strategy. We assume that for all years in our sample, each copycat fund incurs expenses equal to those of the Vanguard Total Stock Market Index fund in 2002, 20 basis points. 17 This fund invests in both large and small capitalization stocks, so its expense ratio should be able to represent a broad cross-section of potential copycat funds. The assumption here is appropriate due to the similarity between a copycat strategy and a passive index tracking strategy, i.e. both strategies require little efforts in equity research and rely solely on the portfolio weights known to the public.
D. Cross-Section of Relative Success of Copycat Funds
In order to find out what kinds of mutual funds are more worth replicating by a copycat investor, we form portfolios on various fund characteristics and performance measures at each disclosure date and investigate under what conditions the copycat strategy can be more successful. The sorting variables include different measures of past performance, expense ratios, size and the representativeness of portfolio holdings. At the end of each filing month for a given mutual fund, we calculate the average market adjusted return and the Carhart four-factor alpha during the past 12 months. 18 The expense ratio and fund size can be obtained directly from the CRSP MFDB for the same filing date. The complication appears when we try to measure the extent to which mutual fund managers intend to conceal their true portfolio positions from the disclosed ones. To evaluate how representative the disclosed holdings are of the fund"s true investment style in the recent past, we first determine the investment style those holdings represent and then estimate how the fund would have performed if its true investment strategy coincides with the style revealed by the disclosed holdings.
In the present study, we use a style classification scheme that has been widely accepted in both practice and academia. Following Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997) , Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (1998) and Chan, Chen and Lakonishok (2002) , we base a fund"s style on the characteristics of the fund"s portfolio holdings along three dimensions, namely, market capitalization, value-growth orientation and momentum. Following DGTW (1997) , at the end of each June all stocks meeting the selection requirements for both CRSP stock file and COMPUSTAT database are triple-sorted into the 125 fractile portfolios based on size, BM-ratio and momentum. Here the BM-ratios are industry-adjusted using the 48 Fama-French industry classifications. 19 Each portfolio has a distinct combination of size, BM-ratio and momentum characteristics and all stocks with similar characteristics are assigned to the same passive portfolio at each formation date. The value-weighted portfolio returns are then computed for each portfolio in the post-ranking months. The benchmark for each stock during a given month is the buy-and-hold return of the portfolio of which the stock is a member during that month. In this study, we treat the characteristic-based portfolios as the investment style benchmarks.
At each filing date, we match each security in a disclosed portfolio to the style benchmark portfolio it belonged to on the report date. 20 Then we calculate the weighted average returns for the 5 months prior to the filing date using the benchmark portfolio returns and the disclosed portfolio weights calculated on the report date. We make the portfolio weights time-invariant because these weights reflect an important dimension of the representativeness, i.e. fund manager"s asset allocation preferences. These monthly returns are what the fund would have achieved if the disclosed holdings are well representative of the average investment style of the fund in the recent past. If the portfolio disclosure is very informative of the investment style the fund has maintained, these style benchmark returns should be highly correlated with the realized fund returns and thus could explain a large portion of the variation in realized fund returns. We decide to look back 5 months into the past prior to the filing date because the representativeness of a fund"s disclosed holdings of its actual investment style both before and after the fund closing out the portfolio at the end of the quarter are of crucial importance for potential copycat managers. The portfolio holdings that are valid at the end of each quarter serve not only as an indication for a fund"s investments in that quarter but also convey information of the fund"s intended investment strategy in the coming quarter. No matter what affects the representativeness of disclosed holdings, the window-dressing immediately before the quarter end or the activeness of the fund"s regular trading, this variable has to be one of the major factors a potential free-rider has to evaluate before making tracking decisions.
Inspired by the study by Brown and Harlow (2001) , for each filing date t, the representativeness of the disclosed portfolio holdings for a fund"s true investment style can be measured by:
In equation (6) is the month t-s buy-and-hold return of the style benchmark portfolio that is matched to stock j at the end of month t-2. Tracking error can be estimated as the volatility of the difference between the fund"s returns and those that would have been achieved if the reported holdings are consistent with the fund"s actual investment style. In this study, we calculate the standard deviation of the return difference between the realized fund returns and the benchmark returns in the 5 months prior to the filing date as a proxy for how far the disclosed holdings have deviated from the fund"s ongoing investment styles. The more representative the holdings are of the true investment styles, the lower the tracking error measure would be. Thus our measure of representativeness could well capture one thing, i.e. the accuracy of holdings in revealing a fund"s true temporary investment styles.
We decide not to use the R-squared from the regression of fund returns against style benchmark returns over the same 5-month period because it is not appropriate here to impose an additional linear structure. The portfolio weights used to compute style benchmark returns are in spirit the same as the constrained factor loadings in the returns-based style analysis proposed by Sharpe (1992) . The difference is that our holdings-based estimation of the "fitted value" does not involve least squares method. Thus any additional linear model is not necessary to obtain a goodness of fit measure. Holdings-based style evaluation stands out for its higher precision and deeper classification (Chan, Chen, Lakonishok, 2002; ter Horst, Nijman, de Roon, 2004) . ter Horst, Nijman, de Roon (2004) evaluate various aspects of returns-based style analysis and find that factor loadings of mutual funds are in general different from the actual portfolio weights. This is mainly because that the individual stock positions of mutual fund managers differs from the weights in the factor portfolios and that not each security might be spanned by common factors.
To investigate the cross-sectional differences in the tracking performance of a copycat fund, we sort all funds existing in a given filing month on the above variables into decile portfolios and calculate the equally weighted post-ranking portfolio returns across all active and copycat funds for the subsequent three months. Next, we link these post-ranking portfolio returns across filing periods to generate full time series of post-ranking returns. This enables us to compare the postranking relative returns of the copycat funds and thus understand what types of mutual funds disclose holdings that are more valuable for a free-riding strategy. Although some mutual funds have report dates that do not coincide with calendar quarter ends, the vast majority of mutual funds file their holdings in February, May, August and November (80% of the observations fall in these four months as shown in Figure 1 ). As a result, we only rebalance the decile portfolio at the end of these four months in our database. Moreover, if any disclosure happens for a mutual fund between the portfolio rebalancing dates, we adjust the copycat replicating strategy for that fund and wait until the next portfolio rebalancing date to re-rank all mutual funds. 21 Based on the average copycat performance of different decile portfolios, we are able to judge for what kinds of funds the disclosed portfolio holdings are of significant value to outside investors who attempt to exploit such investment opportunities and thus constitute important costs for those active funds.
V The Relative Success of Copycat Strategy in Aggregate
A. Performance Comparisons Table II reports various performance measures and fund characteristics averaged across all funds year by year. To minimize any possible survival requirements, we include in our calculation every mutual fund that exists during a given month, regardless of whether that fund survives the entire year. For each month in our sample, we compute the equally weighted average return across all mutual/copycat funds existing during that month. These equally weighted monthly fund returns are then compounded into annual returns for both mutual funds and copycat strategies. The US domestic active equity funds on average earn 11.70% per year before expenses and thus beat the CRSP value-weighted market index by 0.35% per year. However, netting of an average annual expense ratio of 1.26%, mutual funds in aggregate earn 10.33% per year and thus underperform the market by 1.02%. This is consistent with previous studies showing that actively managed mutual funds on average underperform the market portfolio in net returns (Carhart, 1997; Brown and Goetzmann, 1995; Wermers, 2000) . Besides, we see an increasing trend in the average expense ratio before 2003 (reaching 1.46%) and a decreasing one thereafter. Turnover ratios show a similar pattern as expense ratios with its peak value of 106.14% appearing in 2001.
Table II also presents the performance measures and the estimated trading costs for copycat funds. Our copycat strategies generate an average gross return of 11.44% per year, 0.26% lower than that of the average active fund. However, in practice copycat fund managers can not exactly replicate the gross performance computed from closing prices due to the reality of liquidity deficiency and price impacts (Grinblatt and Titman, 1989; Wermers, 2006) . After we deduct the average trading costs of 0.68% per year, the gross return that can be achieved by copycat strategies reduces to 10.70%. 22 Thus copycat funds underperform the active funds in gross returns after trading costs by 1% per year on average. This should not be surprising because the copycat funds have to use outdated holdings data and thus have limited characteristic-or market-timing abilities. As we state in the previous section, the disadvantage of copycat funds in timely access to portfolio information can be offset by their lower expense ratios. Looking at the average net returns, we find that copycat funds are able to outperform their actively managed counterparts by 0.15% per year (10.48% vs. 10.33%). This is mainly due to the lower expense ratio of copycat funds (0.20% per year) as compared to that of active funds. Table III compares the gross/net return measures between copycat funds and active funds. The return difference between the two strategies is used as a proxy for judging the relative success of copycat funds. Panel A of Table III shows that before any trading costs and expenses the copycat funds on average underperform the active funds by 0.01% per month. But the difference is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Netting of the estimated trading costs for copycat funds 22 The magnitude of our estimated trading costs is close to other studies. For example, Chalmers, Edelen and Kadlec (1999) expands this discrepancy to -0.07% per month (significant at 1% level). In general, a copycat strategy cannot attract investors who mainly care about the gross performance before expenses. However, most investors would only pay attention to the net returns that they can receive from a fund manager. The last row of Panel A reports an outperformance in net returns by copycat strategy of 0.017% per month although the result is statistically insignificant. Panel A also compares the net returns before trading costs for copycat funds and the reported returns for mutual funds. Frank, Poterba, Shackelford and Shoven (2004) ignore the possible trading costs for copycat funds and use this measure as the main unit of analysis in their study. They find a net return difference indistinguishable from zero, while in our study we find a statistically significant outperformance by copycat funds (0.073% per month). Given the insignificant gross return difference and the considerably lower expense ratios for copycat funds, the significant outperformance by copycat funds in terms of net returns before trading costs should have been expected. However, there are no compelling reasons to exclude the trading costs borne by copycat funds from any subsequent analysis. In this study we always compare the gross mutual fund return with the gross copycat fund return netting of trading costs.
At the aggregate level, copycat funds are able to marginally outperform their actively managed counterparts after trading costs and expenses. 23 Specifically, the relatively high expenses of mutual funds will eliminate almost all the expected gains from active investments. The findings suggest that periodic portfolio disclosure in aggregate provides outside investors with free-riding opportunities to generate comparable performance to active funds. Outside investors are able to obtain the benefits of fund research and investment strategies without incurring the same level of expenses. This raises serious doubts over the effectiveness of the Commission"s mandatory portfolio disclosure requirement that has aimed for protecting fund shareholders" interests.
B. Disclosure Frequency and Tracking Performance
It has been controversial that more frequent access to portfolio holdings might heighten the potential for free-riding activities. Since before 2004 many funds report their holdings more frequently than they are legally required to, our database provides us with a unique setting to investigate the effect of reporting frequency on the relative success of copycat funds. We now revise our copycat rebalancing algorithm by always selecting the next report date (and the corresponding filing date) for each fund at least 6 months from the previous one (and the corresponding filing date). Then we implement our copycat investment strategy again using the less frequently (semi-annually) available holdings data. In this case the portfolio weights used can be as old as 8 months. Table II reports the annual gross copycat fund returns for both rebalancing frequencies. The semi-annually rebalanced copycat portfolios generate an average gross return of 11.34% per year which equals the market index and is 0.10% lower than that of their more frequently rebalanced counterparts. However, the lower trading costs resulting from the infrequent trading make the two copycat strategies break even in terms of the gross return after trading cost (10.70% per year). In Panel A of Table III , we observe that quarterly rebalanced copycat funds are able to significantly outperform their counterparts with only semi-annual access to the disclosed holdings by 0.01% per month on average before trading cost. Noteworthy, this return discrepancy disappears (economically and statistically) once we take into account the trading costs for both strategies. Thus, more timely access to portfolio information facilitates the discovery of valuable investment opportunities. However, the additional trading costs incurred by exploiting such information will erode the realized performance.
Panel B of Table III compares the copycat strategies with different rebalancing frequencies in detail. We investigate the average gross returns of the two copycat strategies both before and after trading costs from the second to the sixth month after each semi-annual filing date. 24 Copycat funds that are rebalanced as frequently as possible are able to use new reports between the semiannual filing dates to update their portfolios. We first assign fund-month observations into five month-groups based on how far the month is from the corresponding filing date for a given fund (second to sixth month after each filing date). Next, for each calendar month we compute the equally weighted average gross return across funds in the same month-group. At the end we have 5 time series of average returns spanning the overall sample period. Among the 5 months, we only find a significant discrepancy between the two copycat strategies in the fourth month after filing (0.03% both before and after trading costs). The results are both economically and statistically significant relative to the other month-groups. The finding is in line with the fact that new shareholder reports are mostly available at the end of the quarter following each semi-annual filing date. The associated benefit, if any, should be the most conspicuous immediately following the releasing of new portfolio schedules by active funds. Our result in general indicates that frequent portfolio disclosure by mutual funds conveys more valuable private information whereas the concomitant trading costs offset the benefit on average.
C. Portfolio Disclosure Policy Change and Relative Success of Copycat Funds
Artificially changing the frequency with which the holdings data are available has provided us with some intuition on the issue. Nevertheless, the findings in the previous section cannot completely reflect the influence of imposing a more frequent disclosure mandate on the relative success of copycat funds. Our semi-annual rebalancing algorithm does not distinguish between mandatory and voluntary disclosures. Moreover, the average performance comparison overlooks another important dimension of the relative success of copycat funds, i.e. the stability of the tracking performance. Furthermore, the portfolio disclosure policy change may also affect the information content contained in reported holdings.
To investigate the influence of the disclosure policy change in 2004 on the average tracking performance of copycat funds, we compute the equally weighted average return difference across all existing funds or funds meeting our selection criteria in a given month. Figure 2 depicts how the average net return difference between a copycat portfolio and an active fund varies across time for different subsamples. Panel A of Figure 2 shows a dramatic change around 2004 in the pattern of net return differences. We observe excessive fluctuation in net return differences before the Commission mandates quarterly disclosure frequency in 2004. In contrast, after the policy change the trend of tracking performance seems to flatten out and stays slightly higher than zero. In our merged database, 30% of fund-month observations are older than 3 months since the filing dates before 2004 while only 10% of observations are outdated after 2004. 25 To obtain a clearer picture about the value of outdated holdings, we revise our copycat algorithm by shortening the holding period to at most 3 months before new reports are available. Nonetheless, excluding outdated holdings from our analysis results in the same trend and the two lines in Panel A are almost completely overlapped. This confirms our previous finding at the aggregate level that copycat funds with different rebalancing frequencies have qualitatively the same performance after trading costs. The additional trading costs would eat up the potential benefit of using more updated holdings data. Hence the unstable net tracking performance before the policy change can only be attributed to the opaque content of disclosure or active mutual fund trading. Panel C of Table III quantifies the relative success of copycat funds over time. The outperformance of copycat funds relative to active funds in net return increases on average by 0.03% per month after 2004 regardless of whether outdated holdings have been used. The difference is statistically insignificant. In the mean time, the standard deviation of net return differences drops by 0.14% per month after the policy change. Levene variance test shows the volatilities over the two subperiods significantly differ at 1% level.
Since some funds drop out of sample and others join in as time passes by, the above results may be contaminated by the inconsistent fund disclosure policies throughout the whole sample period.
As a result, we only select mimicking target funds that had existed before and survived past the year 2004 in order to better understand the effect of more frequent disclosure requirement on a single mutual fund. In our sample, 1,601 mutual funds experienced the disclosure policy change in 2004. Panel C of Table III shows that these funds outperform their corresponding copycats by 0.02% per month in net returns before 2004 while underperform by 0.04% per month thereafter. The discrepancy of 0.06% per month is statistically significant at 1% level. The standard deviation of the net return differences decreases from 0.18% to 0.08%, which is statistically significant at 1% level. The increased outperformance by copycat funds and the reduced tracking volatility both signify the significant improvement in the relative success of our copycat strategies.
Wermers (2001) argues that the magnitude of the costs arising from frequent portfolio disclosure would depend upon the characteristics and trading strategies of a fund. Consequently, some funds can be less affected by increasing their reporting frequency. Indeed we observe certain funds voluntarily report their holdings more frequently than legally required to before quarterly portfolio disclosure becomes mandatory. To understand the impact of policy change on the funds that are the least likely to be affected, we select 241 funds that have average annual reporting frequency of no lower than 3.5 per year before 2004 from the surviving funds database. Threshold of 3.5 is the average number of disclosures per year across all funds existing after 2004. As a result, the selected funds have been consistent in their disclosure policies. The last column in Panel C of Table III shows a similar pattern as all funds that have survived past 2004. The average net return difference turns positive after 2004 and the improvement between the two subperiods amounts to 0.07% per month that is significant at 1% level. Although the standard deviation also significantly decreases by 0.12% just as other groups of funds, the statistical significance sharply drops as indicated by the Levene F-test. The magnitude of the tracking volatilities for frequent reporters is greater than that of the surviving funds and all funds, i.e. 0.25% per month before the policy change and 0.12% after that. Panel B of Figure 2 clearly visualizes this pattern. It appears relatively difficult for copycat funds to closely track the performance of these frequent reporters, especially prior to the policy change.
To summarize, the mutual funds that experienced disclosure policy change in general suffer significantly from revealing private information more frequently to the public. Copycat funds are able to remarkably improve their relative tracking performance after the policy change in 2004. The result is robust to shifting the mimicking targets to the past frequent reporters that should be less affected by the increased mandatory disclosure frequency. The findings suggest that the current mandatory disclosure requirement has forced mutual funds to be more cautious about camouflaging their true portfolio positions. Funds start to increase the investment value of their disclosed holdings by a desire to attract investors who evaluate fund performance and manager skills based on portfolio disclosures. Only by conveying more valuable investment ideas through portfolio disclosure could distinguish a mutual fund from others that have the same reporting frequency as required. Therefore, the results further confirm our expectations that mandating more frequent portfolio disclosure expands the opportunities for potential free-riders to successfully track or even beat their active counterparts.
D. Determinants of Relative Success of Copycat Funds
Having shown that the copycat investment strategies on average could generate statistically indistinguishable net returns as compared to the active funds, we next analyze different determinants of the return differences using panel regressions. We select the following variables as the candidates for significant determinants of the relative success of copycat funds: expense ratio, turnover ratio, total net assets, fund age, new money growth, trading costs for copycat funds, past performance and the representativeness of reported holdings for a fund"s true investment style. 26 We treat the examination of the determinants of the relative success of copycat funds as the first step to identify factors that have a significant impact on the cross-sectional variation in the relative performance of copycat funds.
We run panel regressions with robust standard errors using the gross return difference, the gross return difference after trading costs and the net return difference after trading costs and expense ratios as the dependent variables respectively. To control for the correlation of the return difference with common risk factors, we follow Carhart (1997) to calculate the abnormal return differences and use them as new dependent variables in the panel regressions. At the beginning of each month for a given fund, we regress the return differences on the four Carhart-factors over the prior 12 months. The coefficients from the 4-factor model in addition to the factor levels in the subsequent month are used to calculate the predicted return difference for that month. Since the estimation of the factor loadings requires at least 1 year of data we lose the first year data for each fund. Past performance of a mutual fund in a given month is measured as the Carhart 4-factor alpha estimated over the prior 12 months. 27 New money growth is calculated over every 3-month period. Since we are interested in the determinants of return difference that can be used to 26 All cash flows are assumed to be invested at the end of the period. The new money growth for fund j in period t is defined as
. 27 We impose another requirement that at least 6 observations should be available to run the regression. implement selective copycat strategies as soon as the holdings are disclosed, for a given copycat fund in each month we first identify the filing date of holdings that are being used in that month. Then the 4-factor alpha over the 12 months prior to this filing date, the representativeness measure corresponding to this filing date and the new money growth as of the report date, i.e. the date on which the reported holdings are valid, are aligned with other explanatory variables to that fund-month observation. Table IV summarizes the regression results for six different model specifications. The first two columns use the raw and abnormal gross return differences as the dependent variables. The two columns in the middle use the raw and abnormal gross return differences after trading costs as the dependent variables. 28 The last two columns examine the determinants of the raw and abnormal net return differences after trading costs and expense ratios.
We document a significant negative relation between the past performance of active funds and the relative success of copycat funds in all specifications. For example, 1% increase in past performance of mutual funds leads to 0.023% per month decrease in the discrepancy of net raw returns between copycat funds and mutual funds on average. Adjusting for common risk factors only makes the results even stronger. Therefore, the copycat strategies targeting for past winning funds will significantly underperform these active past winners. This is not because the past winning funds tend to camouflage their holdings or are enthusiastic in active trading since the portfolio representativeness measures and turnover ratios are also included in the regressions. Fund size is also a critical factor determining the relative success of copycat strategies as indicated in Table IV . We find a significantly positive correlation between the log of TNA and the return differences in all specifications. The results are also robust to adjusting for common risk factors. On average, 1% increase in the TNA of an active fund results in 0.029% per month increase in the relative net performance of its copycat counterpart. Moreover, turnover ratios and fund age have no significant influence on the relative success of copycat funds in all specifications both before and after adjusting for common risks. The expense ratio has a significantly positive effect on the net return differences. Tracking high-expense funds with considerably lower cost would lead to high net return differences. Even if copycat portfolios cannot generate comparable gross returns due to the lack of timeliness in portfolio adjustment, their relatively low expense ratios could offset this and possibly lead to positive net return differences. In addition, we see the representativeness measured by tracking errors has a negative influence on the return differences in all specifications but only significant after common risk adjustment. It appears to be wise to utilize the reported holdings that well approximate a mutual fund"s true investment style. The statistical significance after risk adjustment suggests that analyzing the representativeness of reported holdings is especially useful in predicting the part of the return difference that cannot be attributed to the exposures to the common risk factors. Fund flow shows a similar pattern in its influence on the relative success of copycat strategies as that of representativeness. However, such impact does not seem to be economically significant.
VI The Cross-Section of the Relative Success of Copycat Strategies
We have found in section V that copycat strategies underperform active funds in gross returns while outperform in net returns and these return differences are both insignificantly different from 28 The models of the gross return differences between copycat strategies and active funds concentrate on the value contained in the holdings per se.
zero. Thus in aggregate portfolio disclosures by active mutual funds have already created space for free-riding opportunities. As a result, fund assets would fall and the remaining fund shareholders would bear higher fees since they have to cover the research costs for outside investors. In this section, we examine the cross-section of the relative success of copycat funds, understanding which enables us to identify certain groups of mutual funds that are the most worth copying. According to the methodology discussed in section IV, we form decile portfolios on different sorting variables in order to investigate the post-ranking performance of copycat investments as opposed to that of the corresponding active fund. In particular, we sort all mutual funds existing at the end of a given main filing month (i.e. February, May, August and November) on past performance, representativeness of portfolio holdings, fund sizes and expense ratios into decile portfolios. These sorting variables have all been found to be the main determinants of the relative success of copycat strategies in a multivariate analysis in the previous section. Then the equally weighted post-ranking portfolio returns are computed for both active and copycat investments. The time-series average, CAPM alpha, Fama-French 3-factor alpha and Carhart 4-factor alpha of these post-ranking portfolio returns are estimated.
A. Sorting on Past Performance
We measure the past performance of mutual funds at the end of each main filing month by the average market adjusted returns over the previous 12 months. Decile portfolios are formed and rebalanced at the time of filing and are held for the subsequent 3 months. Table V presents the results by sorting funds on the average market-adjusted returns. 29 The gross/net mutual fund returns show significant persistence when evaluated using average return, CAPM alpha and Fama-French 3-factor alpha across deciles. When we add the Carhart momentum factor into the model, the performance persistence disappears. This is consistent with the findings by Carhart (1997) that the persistence in mutual fund returns is mainly attributed to the stock momentum found by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) . Similar persistence pattern is also found for copycat fund returns although the evidence is only statistically significant under Fama-French 3-factor model.
Panel A of Table V reports the time-series average fund returns and return differences between the active and copycat strategies. The copycat funds tracking past losers in decile 1 on average significantly outperform their actively managed counterparts by 0.07% per month before trading costs and expenses. In contrast, the copycat funds mimicking past winner funds significantly underperform their mimicking targets by 0.12% per month. The gross return difference column in Panel A shows an almost monotonically decreasing trend across deciles, which confirms our earlier findings that past performance of active funds significantly and negatively affect the relative success of copycat funds. The difference between the two extreme deciles is 0.19% per month (significant at 1% level). If past performance is an appropriate proxy for fund manager skills, then the skilled managers seem to be better at protecting their private information while the unskilled funds can be easily outperformed by a simple copycat strategy. This asymmetric effect of past fund performance on the relative success of copycat funds may be attributed to the persistence in investment skills. The active interim trading by skilled managers leads to superior returns while the best strategy for unskilled managers would be to trade as infrequently as possible because any additional trading would exacerbate the already bad performance.
Deducting trading costs for copycat funds does not change the decreasing trend of the gross return differences across deciles but now almost all of them become significantly negative. This is in line with our performance comparison results in section V, i.e. the copycat funds on average significantly underperform the active funds in gross returns after trading costs. The last column of Panel A in Table V shows the variation in net return differences after trading costs and expenses. Tracking past losers results in an average outperformance of 0.09% per month in net return while mimicking past winners leads to an underperformance of 0.11% per month. Both differences are statistically significant at 1% level. The 0.20% per month difference between the two extreme deciles is also significant at 1% level. The copycat funds" advantage in lower expenses explains the significant outperformance when tracking past losing funds. However, this advantage is not large enough to offset the significant underperformance in gross returns after trading costs when tracking past winners. It is noteworthy that the trading costs for copycat funds and the expense ratios for active funds are comparable in magnitude and both show a U-shaped pattern across deciles. 30 This is exactly why the pattern of net return differences is similar to the numbers in the column of gross return differences.
Overall, we see a significant cross-sectional variation in the relative success of copycat funds when the mimicking targets differ a lot in their past performance. Panel B, C and D of Table V presents similar results using risk adjusted returns from CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart models. The magnitude and the significance of the gross and net return differences are almost identical to those in Panel A. Carhart 4-factor model in fact provides us with much stronger results of return differences than before. In Panel D of Table V , we find a net Carhart alpha difference of -0.14% per month for decile 10 and 0.09% per month for decile 1. The discrepancy between the two extreme deciles is 0.22% per month. All numbers are significant at 1% level. Despite underperforming their active counterparts, copycat funds mimicking past winners can still generate an average net return of 1.01% per month that beats any other decile portfolios formed on past fund performance. Given that the performance persistence for mutual funds can be mainly attributed to picking momentum stocks, then duplicating the holdings of past winning funds provides investors with a cheap momentum strategy as found by Wermers (2003) . This could also explain why such superior performance of copycat funds relative to the majority of active funds vanishes when adjusting for the momentum risk factor.
B. Sorting on Representativeness of Reported Holdings
Mutual funds have different incentives to camouflage their disclosed holdings. 31 For instance, past losers may be reluctant to disclose their true investment positions because they try to avoid exposing their excessive risk taking or style drifting behaviors to investors. On the other hand, past winners may tend to do so hoping to protect their valuable private information derived from costly research. Besides, mutual funds that have experienced large money flows may also attempt to conceal their true positions because predatory traders are always able to anticipate part of mutual funds" position building observing the dramatic fund flows (fire sales or liquiditymotivated trading) (Coval and Stafford, 2005; Chen, Hanson, Hong and Stein, 2008) . Other funds may just engage in active interim trading so that their disclosed holdings hardly represent their average investment styles in the recent past. In short, reported holdings may not be representative of the true underlying investment style of a mutual fund. For whatever purpose, it is necessary for any investor to evaluate the accuracy and representativeness of the disclosed holdings before using them. In our study, we measure the representativeness of the reported holdings by computing the tracking errors between the reported fund returns and the style benchmark returns. The higher the tracking error, the lower the holdings" representativeness will be.
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We run panel regressions to analyze the determinants of the representativeness of disclosed holdings. At each snapshot date (Rdate provided by Thomson Financial/CDA database), we collect TNAs, new money growth over a 3-month period prior to the report date, expense ratios, turnover ratios, fund age and the past performance measured as the Carhart 4-factor alphas of the fund"s net returns over the 12 months prior to the report date. Table VI summarizes our main findings on the determinants. We add the squared past performance in the second specification because both skilled and unskilled funds would have incentives to camouflage their portfolios. The shape of the nonlinearity can be captured by the sign and significance of the squared term. In both specifications, time dummies are included. First, we document a significant positive relation between the past performance of mutual funds and the tracking error measure. In addition, we find that the coefficient on the squared past performance is also significantly positive, which indicates a U-shaped pattern in the relation between past performance and the representativeness of holdings. As can be seen from Table VI , turnover ratios and expense ratios are both significantly and positively associated with the tracking error measures in either specification. Furthermore, older funds and funds with capital outflows are found to disclose holdings less representative of their true investment styles. Intuitively, more experienced managers tend to manipulate their portfolio disclosures while the fund managers facing shrinking assets would likely paint a different picture of their investment strategy hoping to attract more investor money.
Table VII reports the cross-sectional variation in copycat fund performance sorted on our representativeness measure. Decile 10 is comprised of funds whose reported holdings are the least representative of their true investment strategies in the recent past, vice versa. The post-ranking average returns for active funds in decile 10 and the returns for the corresponding copycat funds tend to be significantly lower than those for the other decile portfolios in all 4 panels. The discrepancies in gross/net copycat fund returns between the two extreme deciles are all negative but only statistically significant using common risk-adjusted returns. In general, mimicking funds that disclose representative holdings and are consistent in styles generates higher average returns.
Panel A of Table VII presents the time-series average return differences across decile portfolios. No clear pattern can be found in the gross return differences before trading costs. Moreover, these gross return differences are all insignificantly different from zero. Thus, copycat funds could closely track the performance of their active counterparts before trading costs and expenses. When we take trading costs into consideration, the average relative gross performance of copycat funds decreases monotonically from -0.02% per month (significant at 10% level) in decile 1 to -0.16% per month (significant at 1% level) in decile 10. The difference between the two extreme deciles is 0.14% per month that is significant at 1% level. The monotonic pattern is mainly attributed to the increasing trading costs for copycat funds across deciles (from 0.03% to 0.13%).
In unreported result, the increasing trading costs for copycat funds are closely associated with the increasing net turnover ratios of active funds. 33 The last column of Panel A in Table VII presents the net return differences between the copycat funds and the active funds. We can see that the net return differences still decrease (though not strictly monotonically) from low tracking error decile (1) to high tracking error decile (10). The difference in average returns between the two extreme deciles equals 0.09% per month that is significant at 1% level. Interestingly, copycat funds in decile 1 significantly outperform their active targets that disclose highly representative holdings by an average of 0.05% per month. This is mainly due to the copycat"s advantage in lower expense ratios. Expense ratios of mutual funds are positively related to the tracking errors as indicated in Table VI . Specifically, the expense ratios increase from 0.09% per month in decile 1 to 0.13% per month in decile 10. Nonetheless, the low expense advantage for copycat funds in decile 10 is not great enough to offset the corresponding higher trading costs.
The evidence of the relative success of copycat funds is even stronger after common risk adjustment as shown in Panel B, C and D of Table VII , especially under the CAPM model. In particular, using CAPM alpha of net returns, we find that copycat funds significantly outperform their active counterparts on average by 0.05% per month in decile 1 while significantly underperform by 0.07% per month in decile 10. More importantly, the significant outperformance by copycat funds using the most representative holdings (decile 1) is robust to all three formats of risk adjustment. In addition, these copycat funds are also able to generate a higher average net return than all other decile portfolios of active funds. Specifically, the average copycat fund return net of trading costs and expenses for the lowest tracking error decile equals 0.99% per month which is higher than the average net mutual fund return for any other decile and comparable to the average net mutual fund return for past winners in Table V (1.10%). Therefore, by identifying the active funds whose reported holdings are highly representative of their true investment styles, investors are able to outperform these target funds as well as the majority of the fund universe by simply replicating those portfolios. The use of representative reported holdings for copycat strategies helps achieve superior performance net of trading costs and expenses at both relative and absolute levels.
C. Sorting on Expense Ratios
Copycat funds do not have access to the real time portfolio composition of the active funds. Nevertheless, this can be somewhat offset by the copycat funds" advantage in lower expense ratios. Investors thus might anticipate that mimicking high-expense funds could lead to better relative net performance of copycat funds. At each main filing date, we sort all funds into decile portfolios based on the funds" expense ratios. The performance measures of active funds and 33 The net turnover for active funds is calculated by comparing the adjacent levels of holdings and is actually the trades that need to be completed by copycat funds at the end of each filing date.
copycat funds are presented in Table VIII . We notice that the net mutual fund returns decrease monotonically across deciles both before and after adjusting for common risk factors. This is not surprising because by construction the average expense ratios increase from 0.04% per month for the lowest-expense decile to 0.20% per month for the highest-expense decile.
Panel A of Table VIII shows that the time-series average gross/net copycat fund return for the lowest-expense decile is always significantly higher than the rest of the cross-section. The disparity in copycat fund returns between the two extreme deciles become statistically significant after risk adjustment (as shown in Panel B, C and D). Further, the gross return differences between copycat funds and active funds decrease from 0.06% per month (significant at 1% level) for the lowest-expense decile to -0.03% per month (insignificant) in the highest-expense decile.
The difference between these two deciles is 0.09% per month which is significant at 1% level. We also find that the average trading costs for copycat funds increase from 0.04% per month for decile 1 to 0.15% per month for decile 10. Subtracting the trading costs from the gross copycat fund returns, we find that the gross return differences for all deciles become significantly negative except for decile 1 (insignificantly positive). The increasing trading costs for copycat funds in combination with the increasing expense ratios of active funds across deciles could explain the approximate U-shaped pattern of the net return differences in the last column of panel A. The significant outperformance of copycat funds in the lowest-expense decile is mainly due to their outperformance before expenses. The significant positive gross return difference for decile 1 shows that low-expense funds tend to reveal more valuable investment opportunities through portfolio disclosures. In contrast, the outperformance (significant at 10% level) for the highestexpense decile can be totally attributed to the copycat funds" great advantage in lower expense ratios. Common risk adjustments in Panel B, C and D maintain the finding of the relative success of copycat funds in the two extreme deciles but take away the statistical significance.
Taking all findings into account, in general tracking low-expense mutual funds could generate superior returns at both relative and absolute levels. The copycat funds replicating the portfolios of the lowest-expense mutual funds in decile 1 earn an average net return of 0.88% per month, which is higher than the average net return for any other expense-sorted decile. Therefore, outside investors could make use of such valuable free-riding opportunities if they understand the abovementioned cross-sectional variation in copycat performance with respect to fund expenses. Exploiting the valuable information contained in the portfolio disclosures of low-expense funds appears to be more rational than the intuition of taking the low-cost advantage of free-riding by investing in assets held by high-expense funds.
D. Sorting on Total Net Assets
In section V, we have found that fund size has significant positive influence on the relative success of copycat funds. In order to quantify the magnitude of such influence and deeply understand the usefulness of fund size in selective copycat strategies, we sort mutual funds at the end of each main filing month on their total net assets and evaluate the performance of copycat funds relative to their actively managed counterparts and the entire mutual fund industry.
From Table IX , we can see that small mutual funds on average significantly outperform big mutual funds in gross returns before expenses. The difference in gross mutual fund returns between the two extreme deciles is around 0.16% per month (significant at 1% level) in all 4 panels of Table IX . Comparing the first two columns of Panel A, we find that the average monthly expense ratios decrease from 0.15% to 0.08% across deciles. This suggests that small funds in general charge higher fees. The decreasing trend of expense ratios across deciles weakens the sharply decreasing pattern in gross returns when it comes to the net mutual fund return. In Panel A, the time-series average gross/net copycat fund returns also decrease across deciles in general though not in a strictly monotonic way. The gross return differences before trading costs between copycat and active funds are almost all insignificantly different from zero and do not have any particular pattern across deciles. The average trading costs for copycat funds decrease from 0.10% per month for small funds to 0.03% per month for big funds. This is intuitively logical because the implicit costs of trading small and illiquid stocks are potential higher than trading large and liquid stocks. The composite effect of the decreasing trading costs and the increasing advantage of low expenses for copycat funds is presented in the last column of Panel A. We observe a not strictly U-shaped pattern in the net return differences. However, all net return differences are negative or statistically insignificant except that for the largest funds. In decile 10, the copycat funds could outperform their active counterparts by 0.04% per month which is significant at 1% level. The positive difference between the two extreme deciles in the last three columns of Panel A confirms our earlier findings that fund size could have a positive influence on the relative success of copycat funds. Risk-adjustments in Panel B, C and D do not change our finding that copycat funds in decile 10 could significantly outperform their active counterparts, the largest mutual funds.
However, tracking the largest funds would only result in either the lowest net performance across deciles or the significant negative risk-adjusted net returns (see Panel B, C and D) . A rational investor would give up exploiting the relative outperformance and choose to mimic small funds since the average net return of 0.88% per month for copycat funds in decile 1 enables investors to beat all other decile fund portfolios sorted on size. Therefore, despite the indistinguishable relative performance, tracking small funds could still generate a net return that is possibly higher than a majority of the active funds.
VII Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze how outside investors could benefit from free-riding on mutual fund investment strategies using the periodic portfolio disclosures of a large sample of U.S. active equity mutual funds between 1985 and 2008. We have constructed copycat funds, the costless free-riding strategy, each of which replicates a primitive active fund and adjusts its portfolio as soon as the active fund files its holdings with the SEC. We then compare the performance of copycat funds with that of the primitive active funds. The evidence indicates that copycat funds on average outperform their actively managed counterparts in net returns but statistically insignificant. Furthermore, our study also shows that mandating more frequent portfolio disclosure expands the opportunities for professional traders to engage in predatory trading practices such as free-riding. As a result, some investors may choose to exploit the superior information contained in reported holdings without incurring high levels of expenses by engaging in free-riding activities. The findings suggest that the SEC"s portfolio disclosure rules facilitate the outside investors" exploitation of fund holdings and thus might contradict the Commission"s original intention to protect investors" interests and deter funds" abusive activities.
This paper also characterizes certain subgroups of mutual funds whose disclosed holdings are the most valuable for free-riding investors. The significant cross-sectional dispersion in the relative tracking performance of copycat funds helps the potential free-riders better understand the way in which holdings information can be most effectively used. We show that past fund performance, representativeness of reported holdings, expense ratio and fund size are the main determinants of the relative success of copycat funds. It appears that the smartest copycat strategy would be to mimic the portfolios disclosed by past winning funds, funds that disclose representative holdings, small funds and low-expense funds. The net performance of such a selective copycat strategy is in general significantly better than that of the vast majority of the active funds. Finally, our findings provide some insights into the hidden cost of frequent portfolio disclosure for active funds. Policymakers also need to consider the benefits of portfolio disclosure such as increased transparency so as to strike a balance for an optimal disclosure policy design.
Appendix A: Database Construction and Sample Selection
We first start by selecting all U.S. open-ended mutual funds from both CRSP MFDB and TFN/CDA databases spanning a 24-year sample period from January 1985 till December 2008. Over the past 24 years, especially after the 1990, mutual funds offer different classes of shares in a single mutual fund that appeal to different investor clienteles. These share classes confer ownership in the same underlying pool of assets (Wermers, 2000) . In such cases, we select the share class having the longest history of data; if there is no difference by this measure, we select the fund with the lowest CRSP fund identifier (in our sample more than 90% of funds have more than one share classes). 34 Within the sample period US mutual funds are required to file their holdings to the SEC on a semi-annual basis (according to section 30 of ICA 1940) although CDA data team also managed to obtain more frequent holdings data for funds that provide voluntary quarterly portfolio disclosures to their shareholders, large institutional clients or fund-tracking firms such as Morningstar Inc. We focus on US domestic diversified equity funds, for which the holdings data are the most complete and reliable. Thus we follow a procedure slightly different from Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) . 35 We use the CRSP investment objective codes provided by
Lipper (L), Wiesenberger (OBJ) and Strategic Insight (SI) to select all growth funds, income funds and maximum capital gains funds. 36 In particular, we require all mutual funds have at least one the following investment objective classifications or missing:
Lipper(L): 'EI', 'EIEI', 'EMN', 'FLX', 'G', 'GI', 'I', 'LCCE', 'LCGE', 'LCVE', 'LSE', 'MC', 'MCCE', 'MCGE', 'MCVE', 'MLCE', 'MLGE', 'MLVE', 'SCCE', 'SCGE', 'SCVE', 'SESE', 'SG'.
Wiesenberger (OBJ): 'SCG', 'AGG', 'G', 'G-S', 'S-G', 'GRO', 'LTG', 'I', 'I-S', 'IEQ', 'ING', 'GCI', 'G-I', 'G-I-S', 'G-S-I', 'I-G', 'I-G-S', 'I-S-G', 'S-G-I', 'S-I-G', 'GRI', 'MCG'. Strategic Insight (SI): 'SCG', 'GRO', 'AGG', 'ING', 'GRI', 'GMC'.
Furthermore, we also require that the investment objective code reported by TFN/CDA Spectrum is aggressive growth, growth, growth and income, unclassified or missing. All these criteria together most notably exclude any bond funds, balanced funds, asset allocation funds, international funds, precious metal funds and sector funds because these funds generally hold and trade minimal quantities of domestic equities (Wermers, 2000) . We then look at the percentage of stocks in the portfolio as reported by CRSP and select the funds on average hold more than 80% and less than 105% in common stocks. Finally, we eliminate index funds by searching fund names containing the following keywords: "INDEX", "INDE", "INDX", "INX", "IDX", "S&P" and "MSCI". To avoid any abbreviation and misspelling errors, we further match fund names in our database with the above keywords by word similarity.
We next clean the TFN CDA/Spectrum dataset by eliminating the overlapping report dates and file dates caused by fund mergers and name changes. 37 Report dates represent the dates for which the holdings are valid (i.e. actually held by fund managers). File dates ("vintage dates" at quarter ends) signify a particular vintage of data and serve as a primary key to join multiple tables in TFN CDA/Spectrum S12 master files. Due to the problems of staleness and late reports in the TFN/CDA dataset, the file date cannot be used as the corresponding calendar quarter end for which the holdings are valid. Nonetheless, we develop an algorithm to correct for the possible problem of late reports and synchronize the report dates in Thomson database with the appropriate calendar dates. We first select a series of distinct report dates for each mutual fund and assume the filing dates are two months after the report dates. Then we fill the months between filing dates with the most recent report dates and the corresponding holdings data. During the process, we adjust for stock splits for each stock (when necessary) between the file date and the calendar dates.
Next, we use MFLINKS database provided by WRDS to assign a unique Wharton Financial Institution Center Number (WFICN) to each fund in both CRSP MFDB and TFN CDA/Spectrum datasets. 38 As MFLINKS concentrates in US domestic equity funds, we further exclude some non-equity mutual funds if any by assigning the WFICN identifiers. 39 Approximately 92% of the target universe, which was derived by using objective codes and stock holding percentages in CRSP MFDB, has been linked successfully. 40 The MFLINKS table provides us with a reliable means of joining CRSP MFDB and TFN/CDA/Spectrum S12 datasets also because it resolves several issues including re-used fund identifiers and arbitrary change in fund identifiers in TFN CDA/Spectrum database. At the end we match each CUSIP code in TFN CDA/Spectrum S12 dataset to a CRSP PERMNO (the permanent number that CRSP assigns to that security). Holdings associated with CUSIPs for which we are unable to find corresponding PERMNOs are ignored. 41 The incorporation of stock prices enables us to calculate the value weights of each common stock for each mutual fund portfolio disclosure. We also include the number of outstanding shares, the standard industry classification codes and stock returns into our TFN CDA/Spectrum S12 dataset. After the aforementioned screens, our final sample consists of 3,046 mutual funds in the period 1985-2008. 37 These problems remain unresolved but mentioned in WRDS and Wharton Financial Institution Center MFLINKS user"s manual (version: April 2008).
38 MFLINKS has been developed with Russ Wermers as a contributor and ongoing consultant to the project. A good example on the merging procedure and how MFLINKS can be used is Wermers (2000) . 39 Not all mutual funds in CRSP MFDB set are given a WFICN link due to the concentration on US domestic diversified equity mutual funds. 40 The figures are obtained from WRDS and Wharton Financial Institution Center MFLINKS user"s manual (version: April 2008) . 41 The funds of funds are thus excluded since their holdings have CRSP share codes of 9 (for funds).
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Appendix B: Tables & Figures   Table I 
Summary Statistics for Merged Mutual Fund Database
This table presents the summary statistics for the sample of equity mutual funds over the period 1985 to 2008. Gross copycat fund returns are the returns on the hypothetical portfolios that replicate disclosed holdings and are balanced as soon as the updated holdings are available to the public. We assume that for all years in our sample, each copycat fund incurs expenses equal to those of the Vanguard Total Stock Market Index fund in 2002, 20 basis points. Trading costs for copycat funds are estimated using Keim and Madhavan (1997) 
Table II Annual Fund Performance & Characteristics for Merged Mutual Fund Database
For each month, we calculate the equally weighted performance measures and fund characteristics across the entire database. To minimize the potential survivorship bias, if any, all funds will be included in the calculation in each month regardless of whether the fund could survive past the next period. Then the equally weighted monthly returns are compounded into annual returns. Gross copycat fund returns are the returns on the hypothetical portfolios that invest in disclosed holdings and are rebalanced as soon as the updated holdings are available to the public. Q stands for rebalancing the copycat fund as frequently as possible, while S represents the semiannual rebalancing frequency. Trading costs for copycat funds are estimated using Keim and Madhavan (1997) fitted regression and the year adjusted factor by Stoll (1995) and Wermers (2000) . Trade size and portfolio value are assumed to be identical to the active mutual funds. All estimated trading costs are averaged across all copycat funds for a given year. We assume that for all years in our sample, each copycat fund incurs expenses equal to those of the Vanguard Total Stock Market Index fund in 2002, 20 basis points. This table also presents the number of distinct mutual funds in our merged database each year. In CRSP MFDB, 12(b)1 fees are available from 1992, while turnover ratios are missing in 1991.
Performance 
Table III Performance Comparison
This table compares the active mutual funds and the copycat funds in terms of various performance measures. The numbers in Panel A are the outperformance (underperformance) of copycat funds relative to their actively managed counterparts. The details on how to calculate trading costs and expense ratios for copycat funds have been described in Table I and II. We also compare the gross performance between copycat strategies with different rebalancing frequencies (Quarterly Vs. Semiannually). Panel B examines this issue in further detail. For each of the 2-6 months after each semiannual filing date, we calculate the equally weighted average gross copycat fund returns (both before and after trading costs) across all existing copycat funds. Then the time-series averages are computed for each of the five months. Panel C reports the mean and volatilities of the gross/net return differences between copycat funds and active funds over the two subperiods dividing by the year 2004. Independent sample T-tests and Levene F-tests are performed to compare means and variances respectively. All the numbers in the This table presents the determinants of the outperformance/underperformance of copycat funds relative to their target active mutual funds. Trading costs for copycat funds are estimated using Keim and Madhavan (1997) fitted regression and the year adjusted factor by Stoll (1995) and Wermers (2000) . Trade size and portfolio value are assumed to be identical to the active mutual funds. We assume that for all years in our sample, each copycat fund incurs expenses equal to those of the Vanguard Total Stock Market Index fund in 2002, 20 basis points. New money growth is defined as the relative change in TNA over the 3 months before each report date given the net return and the assumption that all inflows happen at the end of the period. Past performance is measured here using the Carhart alpha for the fund's net returns over the 12 months before each report date. The representativeness of portfolio holdings is measured by the standard deviation of the return gap between the net fund returns of its style benchmark returns over the 5 months prior to each filing date. The DGTW (1997) methodology is used to construct our style benchmark for each stock. We use the same portfolio weights computed on the date on which the holdings are valid for each of the 5 months to see what happens if a fund is actually consistent in the style revealed by the disclosed holdings. (-5.23 ) (-1.45 ) (-5.23 ) (-1.43) Past Performance (% per month) -0.026** -0.091** -0.023** -0.093** -0.023** -0.093** (-3.02 ) (-3 .09) (-2.65 ) (-2.95 ) (-2.65 ) (-2 At the end of February, May, August and November, all mutual funds are sorted into decile portfolios based on the average market-adjusted returns over the previous 12 months. and the performance of the mutual funds and their corresponding copycat funds in the subsequent 3 months are kept. Equally weighted portfolio returns are then calculated for each of the 3 months. At the end these portfolio returns are linked across quarters to generate 10 time series of returns. We next calculate for each decile portfolio the average return (Panel A), the CAPM alpha (Panel B), the Fama-French alpha (Panel C) and the Carhart alpha (Panel D) for various performance measures shown below. The return difference measures the relative outperformance or underperformance of copycat funds compared to their mimicking targets. Gross copycat fund returns are the returns on the hypothetical portfolios that replicate disclosed holdings and are balanced as soon as the updated holdings are available to the public. We assume that for all years in our sample, each copycat fund incurs expenses equal to those of the Vanguard Total Stock Market Index fund in 2002, 20 basis points. Trading costs for copycat funds are estimated using Keim and Madhavan (1997) fitted regressions and the year adjusted factor by Stoll (1995) and Wermers (2000) . Trade size and portfolio value are assumed to be identical to the active mutual funds. Merging the Thomson Financial/CDA database, CRSP MFDB and CRSP stock files results in a sample of 3,046 US domestic equity funds from 1985 to 2008. All numbers are monthly returns in percentages, t-statistics are reported in parentheses. + means significant at 10% level, * at 5% level, ** at 1% level. (-4 .14) (-7.25 ) (-4 .00) (1.59) (0.95) (0.81) -0.40 (0.31) (-4 .84) (-8.20 ) (-4.79) D10 -D1 (-4 .57) (-4.44 ) (-4.93) (-4 .39) (-4.27 ) (-4 .71) (-0 .03) (0.08) (-1.23 ) (-1 .08) (-1.08) (-5 .2) (-5 .07) (-5.51) 
Table VI Determinants of Representativeness of Portfolio Disclosures
This table presents the determinants of window dressing which leads to variation in the representativeness of the disclosed holdings of a mutual fund's true investment strategies. The representativeness of is measured by the standard deviation of the return gap between the net fund returns of its style benchmark returns over the 5 months prior to each filing date. The DGTW (1997) methodology is used to construct our style benchmark for each stock. We use the same portfolio weights computed on the date on which the holdings are valid for each of the 5 months to see what happens if a fund is actually consistent in the style revealed by the disclosed holdings. The resulting measure is aligned with other variables at each report date (Rdate) for each mutual fund. The report date provides in Thomson Financial/CDA database is the date on which the holdings are valid. Past performance is measured here using the Carhart alpha for the fund's net returns over the 12 months before each report date. New money growth is defined as the relative change in TNA over the 3 months before each report date given the net return and the assumption that all inflows happen at the end of the period. At the end of February, May, August and November, all mutual funds are sorted into decile portfolios based on the extent of representativeness of holdings and the performance of the mutual funds and their corresponding copycat funds in the subsequent 3 months are kept. Equally weighted portfolio returns are then calculated for each of the 3 months. At the end these portfolio returns are linked across quarters to generate 10 time series of returns. We next calculate for each decile portfolio the average return (Panel A), the CAPM alpha (Panel B), the Fama-French alpha (Panel C) and the Carhart alpha (Panel D) for various performance measures shown below. The representativeness of portfolio disclosures is measured by the standard deviation of the return gap between the net fund returns of its style benchmark returns over the 5 months prior to each filing date. The DGTW (1997) methodology is used to construct our style benchmark for each stock. We use the same portfolio weights computed on the date on which the holdings are valid for each of the 5 months to see what happens if a fund is actually consistent in the style revealed by the disclosed holdings. The return difference measures the relative outperformance or underperformance of copycat funds compared to their mimicking targets. Gross copycat fund returns are the returns on the hypothetical portfolios that replicate disclosed holdings and are balanced as soon as the updated holdings are available to the public. We assume that for all years in our sample, each copycat fund incurs expenses equal to those of the Vanguard Total Stock Market Index fund in 2002, 20 basis points. Trading costs for copycat funds are estimated using Keim and Madhavan (1997) fitted regressions and the year adjusted factor by Stoll (1995) and Wermers (2000) . Trade size and portfolio value are assumed to be identical to the active mutual funds. Merging the Thomson Financial/CDA database, CRSP MFDB and CRSP stock files results in a sample of 3,046 US domestic equity funds from 1985 to 2008. All numbers are monthly returns in percentages, t-statistics are reported in parentheses. + means significant at 10% level, * at 5% level, ** at 1% level. (-5 .36) (-3.72) At the end of February, May, August and November, all mutual funds are sorted into decile portfolios based on the expense ratios on filing date and the performance of the mutual funds and their corresponding copycat funds in the subsequent 3 months are kept. Equally weighted portfolio returns are then calculated for each of the 3 months. At the end these portfolio returns are linked across quarters to generate 10 time series of returns. We next calculate for each decile portfolio the average return (Panel A), the CAPM alpha (Panel B), the Fama-French alpha (Panel C) and the Carhart alpha (Panel D) for various performance measures shown below. The return difference measures the relative outperformance or underperformance of copycat funds compared to their mimicking targets. Gross copycat fund returns are the returns on the hypothetical portfolios that replicate disclosed holdings and are balanced as soon as the updated holdings are available to the public. We assume that for all years in our sample, each copycat fund incurs expenses equal to those of the Vanguard Total Stock Market Index fund in 2002, 20 basis points. Trading costs for copycat funds are estimated using Keim and Madhavan (1997) fitted regressions and the year adjusted factor by Stoll (1995) and Wermers (2000) . Trade size and portfolio value are assumed to be identical to the active mutual funds. Merging the Thomson Financial/CDA database, CRSP MFDB and CRSP stock files results in a sample of 3,046 US domestic equity funds from 1985 to 2008. All numbers are monthly returns in percentages, t-statistics are reported in parentheses. + means significant at 10% level, * at 5% level, ** at 1% level. (-1.36 ) (-0 .31) (-0.86 ) (-0.86 ) (-2.89 ) (-4 .72) (0.82) (0.18) (-2.14) (-1.20 ) (-1.84 ) (-1.84 ) (-3 .49) (-5 .40) (0.36) At the end of February, May, August and November, all mutual funds are sorted into decile portfolios on filing date based on the total net assets on report date (2 months prior to filing date) and the performance of the mutual funds and their corresponding copycat funds in the subsequent 3 months are kept. Equally weighted portfolio returns are then calculated for each of the 3 months. At the end these portfolio returns are linked across quarters to generate 10 time series of returns. We next calculate for each decile portfolio the average return (Panel A), the CAPM alpha (Panel B), the Fama-French alpha (Panel C) and the Carhart alpha (Panel D) for various performance measures shown below. The return difference measures the relative outperformance or underperformance of copycat funds compared to their mimicking targets. Gross copycat fund returns are the returns on the hypothetical portfolios that replicate disclosed holdings and are balanced as soon as the updated holdings are available to the public. We assume that for all years in our sample, each copycat fund incurs expenses equal to those of the Vanguard Total Stock Market Index fund in 2002, 20 basis points. Trading costs for copycat funds are estimated using Keim and Madhavan (1997) fitted regressions and the year adjusted factor by Stoll (1995) and Wermers (2000) . Trade size and portfolio value are assumed to be identical to the active mutual funds. Merging the Thomson Financial/CDA database, CRSP MFDB and CRSP stock files results in a sample of 3,046 US domestic equity funds from 1985 to 2008. All numbers are monthly returns in percentages, t-statistics are reported in parentheses. + means significant at 10% level, * at 5% level, ** at 1% level. (-0.80 ) (-5 .11) (0.37) (0.43) (-1.14) (0.08) (-0 .91) (-1.17 ) (-1.60 ) (-6 .48) (-0.42) 
Proportion of Filings that Fall in Each Month
This figure depicts how often a mutual fund files its portfolio holdings with the SEC in one of the twelve months in our merged mutual fund database. The percentage for each month is computed as the number of fund-month observations in that month divided by the total number of fund-month observations. Jan 2% 
Relative Success of Copycat Funds over Years
This figure depicts the return difference between the average copycat fund and active fund. We assume that for all years in our sample, each copycat fund incurs expenses equal to those of the Vanguard Total Stock Market Index fund in 2002, 20 basis points. Trading costs for copycat funds are estimated using Keim and Madhavan (1997) fitted regressions and the year adjusted factor by Stoll (1995) and Wermers (2000) . Trade size and portfolio value are assumed to be identical to the active mutual funds. Panel A shows the dynamics of the net return differences based on all holdings data and the holdings that are not older than 3 months. In Panel B, we only select funds that have survived past 2004 and a subset of those funds that frequently disclosed their holdings before 2004. 
